ABSTRACT
has been used in urban studies to understand the reconfiguration of urban spaces, such as the creation of gated communities under neoliberalism, as well as so-called ethnic or immigrant enclaves (see Caldeira 1996; Landman 2006; Pow 2007) .
We attempt here to extend the concept beyond political economy or urban studies and to view post-apartheid enclaving as socio-spatial processes that include economic, state and social elements.
We contend that a systematic study of the emerging social order in mining towns such as Rustenburg and the rest of the platinum belt provide illustrations of the emerging socio-spatial formations in the rest of the country. Our analysis is informed by David Harvey's (2006) understanding of space as absolute, relative and relational.
Absolute space refers to concrete structures in the Newtonian sense of the word. It refers to mountains, rivers, and platinum ore, but also roads, walls and houses. To quote Harvey (2006: 121) :
"Absolute space is fixed and we record or plan events within its frame. This is the space of Newton and Descartes and it is usually represented as a pre-existing and immoveable grid amenable to Relative space introduces the time dimension, as well as where one stands, or observes from, an Einsteinian element. Whereas two points on a map may be removed from each other in absolute terms, a fast train or an aeroplane may bring them closer in relative terms -the friction of distance.
Again, Harvey (2006: 121-122) : "Space is relative in the double sense: that there are multiple geometries from which to choose and that the spatial frame depends crucially upon what it is that is being relativized and by whom [...] All forms of measurement depended upon the frame of reference of the observer [...] We know, given the differential frictions of distance encountered on the earth's surface, that the shortest distance (measured in terms of time, cost, energy expended) between two points is not necessarily given by the way the legendary crow flies over physical distance.
Furthermore the standpoint of the observer plays a critical role."
Relational space refers to the subjective experience of landscapes, drawing Leibniz's critique of the Newtonian idea that the observer can be positioned outside space as an observer. Relational spatiality is space experienced, and lived: "The relational view of space holds there is no such thing as space outside of the processes that define it. Processes do not occur in space but define their own spatial frame [...] The relational notion of space-time implies the idea of internal relations; external influences get internalized in specific processes or things through time [...] In a way, relational conceptions of space-time bring us to the point where mathematics, poetry, and music converge" (Harvey 2006: 122-123 ).
According to Harvey (2006: 125) , we "cannot box political and collective memories in some absolute space (clearly situate them on a grid or a map) nor can I understand their circulation according to the rules, however sophisticated, of relative space-time." He argues: "If I ask the question: what does Tiananmen Square or 'Ground Zero' mean, then the only way I can seek an answer is to think in relational terms" (Harvey 2006: 125) . The same applies to Marikana, the informal settlement at Wonderkop and gated communities in and around Rustenburg.
Thus, in the context of this paper, the notion of enclave denotes socio-spatial formations created by contending social forces in defence of their historical interests, in pursuit of new positions and privileges and in defence against the erosion of their existing socio-economic positions. Our argument is based on observations and interactions during numerous research trips to Rustenburg in order to conduct field work for academic and commissioned research from 1998 to the present, supplemented by census data and a reading of policy documents, mostly from Rusternburg's local government authorities. Now we turn to case studies from Rustenburg, the centre of South Africa's platinum belt that has attracted worldwide interest because of the massacre of mineworkers by the police in August 2012 and the 2014 strike, the longest the South African mining industry has ever seen.
Enclave Rustenburg
The recent history of Rustenburg is the story of platinum. According to Capps (2012: 66) South Africa has an estimated 87% of the world's platinum reserves and produced 76% of the word's platinum in 2009 -the bulk of this from Rustenburg and its hinterland. Rustenburg is often presented as a platinum mining success story, with municipal authorities pointing to the town's economic growth rate, which is much higher than South Africa's as a whole. Mining accounts for more than half of the town's economy (53% in 2009). Rustenburg, which means place (or literally castle) of rest, was named as such by the Boers who settled in the then Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR) in the mid 1800s. It was established even before Pretoria, and became the centre of the Gereformeerde Kerk (Reformed Church), a Calvinist splinter group from the older Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk (Dutch Reformed Church). The town formed a trading centre for the agricultural community and included prominent Indian traders right from the onset. Currently, a street in central Rustenburg is named after one of these trader families, the Bhayaats.
Mining booms tend to produce winners and losers and Rustenburg is no exception. Manufacturing has not kept pace with developments in mining. In fact, manufacturing jobs declined from approximately 12 000 in 1995 to 7 000 in 2009. Mining booms also tend to happen very fast and create logics of their own. The platinum belt around Rustenburg seems to have developed with little real urban planning. There is a staggering range of government planning documents and reports by consultants, but little evidence that these documents transpire into real processes of urban development. An important indicator: 45.1% of Rustenburg's residents live in formal houses, while 41.5% live in shacks (Rustenburg Local Municipality 2011, 35) . This figure of nearly 42% is high when one considers the national average of 15% of people who reside in shacks. Of Rustenburg's estimated 500 000 residents, roughly 250 000 live in areas that are classified as "non-tribal land". A further 150 000 people live on "tribal land", 30 000 in compounds, and 40 000 on farms in the municipal area (Rustenburg Local Municipality 2012a, 26 In Tables 1 and 2 we present the numbers and proportions of Rustenburg's population groups as classified by the Census data, as well as numbers and proportions of first languages spoken by the city's residents. We provide these figures as a baseline for the overall picture in Rustenburg and this becomes significant when one examines data for smaller areas. The presence of significant numbers of IsiXhosa, Xitsonga and Sesotho speakers is indicative of the legacy of migrant labour in the mining industry, with many of the latter two groups drawn from Mozambique and Lesotho respectively. The reference to "the lack of law enforcement" in local government documents could be applied to a number of state functions and in the absence of a functional state in the area (or adequate planning by mining companies), a process of enclaving characterises the transition from apartheid to a new order on the platinum belt. We now turn to four common sense socio-spatial categories under apartheid in order to structure our discussion of the emerging post-apartheid order -these categories are suburb, compound, township and homeland.
Suburb
The term suburb in the South African context historically referred to areas delineated for residential occupation by South Africans classified as white. As the poet Denis Hirson wrote about these spaces, White Afrikaans speakers still dominate in Safari Tuine (76% white and 68% Afrikaans), but this suburb has a significant number of English speakers as well (15%).
There was already a measure of class stratification in apartheid's white suburbs, but this has become more striking and has accelerated. Broadly, suburbs today are more segmented than in the past and this segmentation reflects both race and class. At the bottom end are what we call gateway suburbs, township style housing that is built in open spaces in-between formerly white suburbs and the townships, which means they are closer to town than the townships of old. An example of this is Thlabane West. Upwardly mobile black mineworkers, many of them union shop stewards, can now afford their own homes. Many also rent apartments from mining companies that are located close to new shopping centres and suburban schools. Others rent back rooms and garages in suburbs that may be socially more isolated, but closer to amenities than townships and informal settlements. The second tier is the formerly white working class areas, where 'white flight' often results when largescale black in-migration takes place. It is here where one finds a degree of integrated residential patterns. The third tier is made up of the more established white middle class areas. In many of these the demographic profile of residents looks similar to the past with only a smattering of black residents. Clearly, the logic of the old pass laws and its brutal system of policing by racial profiling is no longer possible here, at least not overtly. But class has become a major predictor of who can reside in these areas. In many of these suburbs private security firms now operate from remote control rooms where they can respond to household alarms and panic buttons.
Located nearby the middle class areas, is the fourth tier, made up of palatial homes, many of them in gated housing estates where the privatisation of policing is taken to an extreme level. Indeed, if one takes the N4 highway -or the Platinum Highway -from Pretoria to Rustenburg, one of the first sights that strikes the motorist is a number of mansions on the hills that look down on the valley with its platinum mines and sprawling informal settlements. These mansions -sarcastically called
McMansions by some locals, referring to the uniformity of these faux-Tuscan villas -are in typical
South African security estates with strict access control. We tried in vain to get access to one of these villages in order to study it more closely. Without a contact on the inside who could vet us, the security guards did not allow us to enter the gates. Access control systems use biometric systems in order to identify residents and their domestic staff. This gated community, which forms part of the suburb of Cashan, is the most extreme form of elite enclaving in Rustenburg.
In terms of absolute space, a number of suburbs have been gated -houses are now surrounded by high walls with electric fences and entrances are guarded by private security firms and biometric technology that can determine whether a person can enter such a space or not. Suburbs that are not gated are often guarded by "armed response" security companies. In terms of relative space, where you stand becomes important -whether you are on the inside or the outside. Where state infrastructure fails (both physical, but also schools and health care), the market provides in the form of private schools and hospitals. But our discussion also shows significant relational elementsresidents feel a sense of belonging and security inside these spaces, but fear and vulnerability when they leave them. Those on the outside are subjected to searches and harassment when they move through suburban spaces, not by the police, but privatised militia. There is a social profile of the kind of person who belongs in these spaces and those who do not, profiles that are classed, raced and gendered (see Valji, Harris & Simpson 2004 ).
Compound
As in other mining towns, worker compounds are a major feature of accommodation arrangements around the platinum mines of Rustenburg. Moodie (2015) points out that mining companies had different approaches to the control of compounds and their final opening up for organising by the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) after its formation in 1982. The NUM came rather late to Rustenburg and its formation was complicated by a number of factors. There were major differences between Anglo-American and Gencor mines, with Gencor being more authoritarian and anti-union.
To make matters worse, Rustenburg Impala Platinum, owned by Gencor, was located in the bantustan of Bophuthatswana, where the union was not allowed to organise. In this context workers relied on pre-existing forms of informal organisation to mobilise solidarity. As Dunbar Moodie shows in this issue, these structures became the basis for the emergence of worker committees that predate formal union organisation. Underground organisation by the NUM as part of the liberation struggle operated alongside, but at times in competition with these worker committees, and initially took on the form of marshals. 'Revolutionary discipline' was not always based on solidarity and persuasion, but often on violent enforcement, which became part of recognised organising repertoires in Rustenburg.
In spite of these differences between mining firms regarding their use of compounds, the fact remains that the institution was initially designed as a form of spatial control by management, but once captured by the union, also proved to be an effective tool of union control over the movement of members during strikes (see Bezuidenhout & Buhlungu 2011) . In part due to this turning of the tables by the union, and in part due to political pressure, mining companies sought to 'depopulate' the compounds from the 1990s onwards (Crush & James 1991) . The government sanctioned Mining
Charter added to this pressure by setting targets for a reduction on compound-based employees.
The NUM initially resisted the notion of living out allowances, arguing that this would lead to slums (Moodie 2015), but one also has to see this in the light of the union realising that it was losing an important instrument of control over a captive membership. It should also be pointed out that the NUM emerged as a force in Rustenburg at a time when influx control had already been abandoned by the apartheid state and informal settlements already had been present in close proximity to some of the mine compounds. With repression in some of the compounds, the union used neighbouring settlements as organisational base in order to infiltrate compounds, leading, at least in one case, to the destruction of a settlement by a mining company in response (Moodie 2015).
Nevertheless, there is general consensus that the compound as a form of control is less central to mining towns now than two decades ago. As Moodie (2015,??) argues in this issue: "The move from hostels into informal settlements, clustered around the mines across the platinum belt, has complicated union (and management) relations with workers. Mine hostels themselves, however, like all complex social institutions, were never passive structures dominated by white managers and black indunas. They were hives of social activity, myriad informal networks, differentiated and overlapping in manifold ways. There were friendship networks of 'home-boys' (often cutting across mines), drinking buddies, room groups, work groups, ethnic organizations, sports teams, criminal gangs, church congregations, ethnic associations, stokfels, people on the make and people on the Those workers who move out of compounds have moved into different forms of residential arrangements, including informal settlements, but also houses in townships and suburbs. Upward class mobility is taking place simultaneously with downward mobility.
In terms of absolute space compounds have always been gated. Ironically, these walls are now used by those on the inside to keep potential criminal elements out, whereas they were initially designed to imprison those on the inside. Again, in relative terms, where one is located in the hierarchy of residence, hostel or compound becomes significant -they provide variable degrees of comfort and protection. Also, all those who live in compounds are employed and not surrounded by unemployed community members and relatives, which is not the case in the surrounding townships and informal settlements. Hence, some mine compounds, like the gated communities on the hill, have now become enclaves of relative prosperity and stability. In relational terms living in a residence implies security and some sense of protection from arbitrary violence, as these former compounds are still protected by company security staff or subcontracted security companies. This is not to say that compound residents are completely isolated from surrounding communities. Many of these men move between the compounds, townships, informal settlements, and their rural villages back home in a dynamic interaction.
Township
Historically Rustenburg had two main urban townships, namely Tlhabane and Boitekong. A thirdPhokeng -was classified as a village during the apartheid and homeland era, but has grown from a settlement of 4 951 inhabitants in 1960 to a township of 43 800 inhabitants by 2001 (Capps, 2003: 1). Planning documents now refer to Phokeng as a residential "cluster", alongside Boitekong.
Tlhabane, the oldest of the townships was established in the 1920s as the result of forced removals.
It was first known as Oukasie, which is an abbreviation of the Afrikaans words "Ou Lokasie", translated as "Old Location". In 1977, with the "independence" of Bophuthatswana, Tlhabane was excluded from the borders of South Africa. Phokeng also formed part of Bophuthatswana, which meant that residents from these townships were stripped of their South African citizenship.
Boitekong was established in the 1960s and did not fall within the borders of Bophuthatswana. As such it was administered by the South African government. These townships, with their 'matchbox' houses and grid-like dusty streets, were typically designed as labour dormitories whose residents were initially meant to meet the labour needs of the town, principally domestic service, local government, commerce and the small manufacturing sector. With the abandonment of influx control in the mid-1980s, the outskirts of these townships became areas where informal settlements sprung up. Like the suburbs, these townships have also segmented into new residential formations.
The first segment is made up of the old parts with typical matchbox houses. Here we have to note from the outset differences between Boitekong and Phokeng, the first falling under the Rustenburg local government and the second being part of Bafokeng land. We expand on this point in the next section, but we have to note here that the different regimes of local government, with the involvement of traditional leaders in the allocation of land in the case of Phokeng limiting the speed of expansion and in-migration. The Review of the Rustenburg Integrated Development Plan explains how the two regimes impact differently on places such as Boitekong (located on "non-tribal land") and Phokeng (located on "tribal" land):
The Boitekong Cluster is a settlements cluster that is largely linked to the growth in the platinum mining industry, which has led to an immigration of people to this cluster seeking employment on the adjacent mines. Consequently, the Boitekong Cluster has had an exceptionally high growth rate in recent years, a trend that is expected to continue. Based on this, it is expected that the Boitekong Cluster will grow in the order of 5% per annum during the forthcoming years [...] The growth of the Phokeng Cluster will not be as dramatic.
This settlement cluster has not expanded at the same rate over the past few years. This is despite the fact that it is located close to the core area and has partly to do with Bafokeng's policy of providing land only for Bafokeng citizens on Bafokeng-owned land. The growth rate of the Phokeng Cluster is therefore expected to be approximately 2% per annum (Rustenburg Local Municipality 2012b, 27 ).
This impression from local government planning documents is confirmed by the 2011 Census data.
Phokeng's residents are 77% Setswana-speaking, whereas Boitekong is only 56% Setswana-speaking. Freedom Park, near Impala Platinum, was established in 1986 by women who set up shacks in order to sell liquor to mine workers. According to the 2011 Census it has a population of more than 23 000 and a density of 3 661 persons per square kilometre. Men form 63% of the community, which, like Nkaneng, includes a mine compound, Wildebeestfontein, as well as a section with RDP-type houses.
Setswana and IsiXhosa speakers constitute equal proportions of 30% of the community, followed by Sesotho speakers (19%) and Xitsonga speakers (9%). In the Census sub-place Freedom Park B (which excludes the RDP-type houses) men account for 65% of the community and Sesotho speakers account for 35% of the community and IsiXhosa-speakers account for 32%, far outnumbering any other linguistic group. An analysis of income levels in Wonderkoppies and Freedom Park show a clustering around the mean wages of mineworkers, which provides for a more homogenous class composition in these areas than in places such as Cashan and Tlhabane (see Figure 5 ).
The fourth segment comprises of state built houses -so-called RDP houses, named after the now abandoned Reconstructed and Development Programme. These settlements are typically built by the state on mostly affordable land on the outskirts of existing townships and informal settlements.
They are modelled on older matchbox housing settlements, but are generally a smaller, cheaper and poorly built version. As in other parts of the country, these settlements also lack infrastructure, and urban planning that may lead to the creation of sustainable communities with public amenities such as shopping areas, school, places of worship and recreational facilities and articulation with viable and affordable public transport systems. Local government reports cite of litany of problems associated with these areas: "RDP Houses used as business sites -owners renting out houses to nonSouth African residents"; "Crime growing/spreading"; "High unemployment rate resulting in crime and prostitution"; and "Problems with sewer blockages and overflowing at RDP township" (Rustenburg Local Municipality 2012a, 182, 186, 260) .
The fifth segment is made up of former coloured and Indian townships, Karlien Park and Ziniaville respectively. In Karlien Park, a very small area, significant integration has taken place with coloureds accounting for 39% of the population (a mere 785 people, mostly Afrikaans speaking) and Africans (mostly Setswana speakers), accounting for 58% of the population. Ziniaville was created in the 1960s when Indian South Africans were removed from the town centre. It is still predominantly Indian, with 69% of the population here classified as such by the 2011 Census.
None of these spaces are gated in absolute spatial terms like security villages or compounds. There is also very little evidence of privatised security firms patrolling the streets and residents here rely on the state for policing, which is more often than not woefully inadequate. Housing structures are also quite diverse, ranging from township "matchbox" houses built under apartheid to so-called RDP houses, from new private sector developments to sprawling shacklands such as Freedom Park and Nkaneng. Again, where you are placed in this geography in relation to others has meanings for access to physical and social infrastructure and services. At the time of the 2012 strike at Impala
Platinum the makeshift police station in Freedom Park was set up in an old shipping container -this in the world's richest platinum mining town. Maybe not surprisingly the "station" was burnt down during the strike. Relationally, therefore, especially residents of informal settlements, have a different sense of the state and expectations of personal safety. Law and order, in the loose sense of the word, are often maintained by vigilante groups that morph into protection rackets -a privatisation of the security function but of a completely different order. As Chinguno (2013b: 642) points out: "An important feature of many of the informal settlements is the weakness or absence of local state structures. These have been in some cases substituted by informal structures that use vigilante-type violence to maintain order. This created a context for alternative systems to emerge.
Many of them are 'no-go areas' for the South Africa Police Service."
Can we call these spaces enclaves? Not in the same way as gated communities and compounds, especially in terms of absolute space. But our analysis has shown that at the relational level, informal settlements are profoundly gendered as they are dominated by young men. Of course, they are also classed and raced, but added to this are important ethnic markers that characterise daily life. It has to be noted that this form of localised vigilantism is not a new repertoire. To be sure, it is reminiscent of the people's courts during the anti-apartheid struggle when the state was forced to retreat from townships, as well as attempts by rural communities, often led by migrant mineworkers, to prevent cattle theft when the state was seen to be failing to address the situation (Simpson 2004) .
'Homeland'
In close proximity to Rustenburg is the former 'homeland', or less politely, bantustan, of Platinum deposits were later discovered within the borders of the "homeland", specifically on land under the control of the Bafokeng traditional authority. One of the major platinum mining companies, Impala Platinum, still mines on Bafokeng land. Impala Platinum paid royalties to the Bafokeng authorities to mine on their land and in 1999 made a deal to continue doing this for another 40 years. These royalties were converted into share ownership as a black empowerment initiative. This makes the Royal Bafokeng Holdings the single largest share owner of Impala (see Capps 2012 ).
According to a fact sheet published by Royal Bafokeng Holdings (Pty) Limited, it is "the primary investment vehicle of the Royal Bafokeng Nation (RBN), a community of approximately 300 000
Tswana-speaking people with substantial, minerals-rich land holdings in South Africa's North West
Province." When one considers historical data on the area, this estimation of 300 000 is most probably an exaggeration. Other estimates put the figure closer to 150 000 (Capps 2003 (1996) refers to as a bifurcated state, a legacy of the colonial and apartheid periods that constituted distinct urban and rural political spheres that perversely continue in the post-apartheid era.
In practice the resources of the Bafokeng mean that Rustenburg has two local authorities. One is the elected Rustenburg Local Municipality and the other is the Royal Bafokeng authority. Both authorities provide services and both have town planning functions. This is another example of how gated communities operate in Rustenburg. In addition to Phokeng, the main residential area, the official Bafokeng territory of the former bantustan, now reconstituted as the Royal Bafokeng Nation, comprises of a number of rural settlements or villages, including GaLuka and Chaneng.
It is therefore important to take into account the legacy of Bophuthatswana borders, which still define two different forms of local government in the area. This is particularly important due to the interventionist stance on local development taken by the Royal Bafokeng Authorities. Ironically, in the case of Rustenburg, some those who live on Bafokeng land, previously part of Bophuthatswana, seem to be better serviced than some of those who live on "non-tribal" land (exceptions are those who live in outlying Bafokeng villages) (see Capps, 2003) . This is due to the use of income from platinum mining by the Royal Bafokeng authorities for development. This possibly explains the fact that conflict often takes the form of "tribalism" and the importance of migrant oppositional cultures.
Again, as in the case of townships and informal settlements, the boundaries of places such as Phokeng are not marked by walls and gates, apart from a place such as the Lebone II College, which has access control. In former "homeland" areas markers are more relational and operate along ethnic lines such as whether people can claim to be Mofokeng. Yet these old boundaries remain significant in the post-apartheid era and may imply significant upward social mobility, such as cases where children meet the entry requirements for the Lebone II College -70% of places in this institution are reserved for Bafokeng children -a different texture of enclavity.
Conclusion
Post-apartheid Rustenburg is characterised by different kinds of enclaves that emerged during the course of the decomposition of the apartheid social order. This resulted from the end of the sociospatial engineering project that had come to characterise the mining industry for more than a century. The inauguration of the democratic state deprived the project of official state underwriting that it had enjoyed all along. Importantly, the ruling party comprised a coalition of forces that included some of the most powerful trade unions in the country, notably the National Union of
Mineworkers. This had far-reaching social and political consequences for the industry. Whilst migrant labour continues, the local regimentation of migrant workers in compounds has collapsed.
The migrant labour system is no longer a system underwritten by the state and the industry has been forced to devise new approaches to stabilising the mining labour force in mining areas. Indeed, Intensified exposure, particularly of working people, to the vagaries of unregulated markets, including steep price hikes and inflation, high interest rates, rampant profiteering and a general increase in the cost of living for low income households, have forced many to look inward. Add to this the ever-escalating rate of employment insecurity, job loss and unemployment, and we have a potent cocktail for social instability. Some of these pressures are induced by choices made at the workplace, industry and national state levels. But it is important to point out that global economic pressures are an important part of the context that gives rise to these local choices. Matters of crime and lack of personal security are crucial contributory factors that follow the collapse of the old infrastructure of apartheid social engineering. At issue is not only the collapse of the old system that offered security to the minority and kept the majority controlled through a battery of coercive measures, but the failure of the new state to provide security at the level of communities, neighbourhoods and private household and individuals. The flipside of this is the inability of markets to provide safety and security to people as citizens and as communities and the exposure of individuals to personal, corporal risk and harm.
It is against this backdrop that the trend towards enclaving discussed in this paper should be understood. Indicators point to inadequate urban planning for the rapid growth of mining activities. "A further consequence of the fear of crime has been an accelerating retreat of middle-class communities behind high walls and private security, prompting a withdrawal from public space and pre-empting the possibility of relationship-building. Although there is a growing black elite who can now afford to join the 'laager', a recent survey reveals that only 2% of blacks have a private security or armed response system -in contrast to 45% of whites [...] Ironically, the construction of high walls, intended to protect, tends to fuel the cycle of fear and crime. Walls and fences have become the visible face of exclusion; a barrier between the haves and the have-nots. Although these barriers take on a different form today than in the past, they have the same effect of marginalizing a population that is almost exclusively black. This can fuel resentment and a sense of injustice on one side of the wall, and a sustained sense of entitlement and privilege on the other."
In the case of informal settlements the movement of people through such spaces is policed by vigilante groups and violence is not outsourced to formal private security firms -mostly men take direct responsibility for "law" enforcement, often by acts of violent retribution. What these enclaves have in common is the desire to secure life in the context of a state that is dysfunctional and that has retreated from the provision of security as a public good. In order to do this, enclaved communities have to mobilise the infrastructure required and have to deploy resources, both physical and human.
The rich can mobilise private security companies, sophisticated technology and walls. In some cases they may even use political influence to mobilise state resources. Workers in converted compounds are able to mobilise company resources to gate and police their living spaces. Those who live in informal settlements have very few of these resources available and have to rely on community solidarities -they are not able to outsource the violence required to police daily life and this is done directly and informally. A focus on everyday violence in informal settlements at the expense of how this relates to the outsourced violence that underwrites elite enclaving, as well as the enclaving projects of upwardly mobile mine workers and union office bearers, misses a major part of the transition from apartheid to a fractured post-apartheid order.
As will have become apparent in the discussion above, space is never neutral, it is socially produced and, in the process of its production, it is inscribed with relations of power and powerlessness (Harvey 2006 (Harvey , 2012 Lefebvre 1991) . A security village, a compound or an informal settlement is never just a residential space. Thus mapping this fractured post-apartheid social order onto the Rustenburg landscape provides for a complex but potentially fruitful understanding of the South African transition and new articulations of class, race, gender, nationality and ethnicity. We have not focused in this paper on the immediate spatial dynamics the led to the Massacre -the workers being sent from the stadium and how they then commandeered Wonderkop as a space. This larger map does, however, provide for some understanding of the context that formed the backdrop to the tragic events of August 2012 and their aftermath.
